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Abstract
Background: Recent studies have suggested that vaccination with seasonal influenza vaccine resulted in an
apparent higher risk of infection with pandemic influenza H1N1 2009. A simple mathematical model incorporating
strain competition and a hypothesised temporary strain-transcending immunity is constructed to investigate this
observation. The model assumes that seasonal vaccine has no effect on the risk of infection with pandemic
influenza.
Results: Results of the model over a range of reproduction numbers and effective vaccination coverage confirm
this apparent increased risk in the Northern, but not the Southern, hemisphere. This is due to unvaccinated
individuals being more likely to be infected with seasonal influenza (if it is circulating) and developing
hypothesised temporary immunity to the pandemic strain. Because vaccinated individuals are less likely to have
been infected with seasonal influenza, they are less likely to have developed the hypothesised temporary immunity
and are therefore more likely to be infected with pandemic influenza. If the reproduction number for pandemic
influenza is increased, as it is for children, an increase in the apparent risk of seasonal vaccination is observed. The
maximum apparent risk effect is found when seasonal vaccination coverage is in the range 20-40%.
Conclusions: Only when pandemic influenza is recently preceded by seasonal influenza circulation is there a
modelled increased risk of pandemic influenza infection associated with prior receipt of seasonal vaccine.
Background
Recent Canadian research has suggested that individuals
who had received the seasonal influenza vaccination
were at a higher risk of being infected with pandemic
influenza H1N1 2009 (pH1N1) than unvaccinated indi-
viduals [1]. Four different studies from Canada reported
that, compared to no vaccination, prior vaccination with
seasonal vaccine increased the odds of infection with
pH1N1 from 1.4 to 2.5. The authors proposed several
explanations for these unexpected findings which were
further discussed by Viboud and Simonsen [2]. Similar,
but weaker, findings were found in several studies from
the United States (US) with non-significant odds ratios
above 1 [3-5]. In contrast to the Northern hemisphere
experience, a study in the Southern hemisphere
(Victoria, Australia) found no risk associated with
receipt of seasonal vaccine with an age-adjusted odds
ratio of 0.97 [6]. All of these studies only used data
from the ‘first wave’ of the pH1N1 outbreak covering
t h ep e r i o dM a r c h - J u l y2 0 0 9a n dh e n c eo u rm o d e l
focuses on this time frame as well.
People infected with one strain of influenza will, in gen-
eral, have immunity to this strain and will have partial
immunity (cross-immunity) to strains that emerge by
mutation from the infecting strain. The level of cross-
immunity will diminish with increasing number of amino
acid differences between strains [7]. New pandemic strains
are characterized by minimal host immunity. It has been
postulated that a ‘short-lived strain transcending immu-
nity’ after any influenza infection may exist [8]. Modelling
studies have demonstrated that only with the inclusion of
this short-lived strain transcending immunity do the mod-
els reproduce the slender phylogenetic tree structure [9] of
influenza [8,10-14]. The mean duration of this
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3-6 months give realistic results in the models, and are
supported by the available experimental and epidemiologi-
cal literature, well summarized in Ferguson et al. 2003 [8].
Although previously demonstrated in animal models
(see references in [15]) the concept of heterotypic and
heterosubtypic temporary immunity is very difficult to
demonstrate in observational studies of humans, because
it is rare to find sequential or contemporaneous circula-
tion of different influenza types or sub-types. The 2009
pH1N1 outbreak was one such opportunity. Prior to the
pandemic of 2009, the most recent period when this
occurred was in 1977 when influenza A(H1N1) followed
circulation of influenza A(H3N2). A largely forgotten
and inappropriately uncited study from Japan was able
to capitalise on the routine collection of sera from Japa-
nese school children between December 1977 and
March 1978 to explore temporary heterosubtypic immu-
nity [15]. The investigators used questionnaire data and
sequential serological samples from children at four dif-
ferent schools to demonstrate ‘cross-subtype protection
in humans during sequential and/or concurrent epi-
demics caused by two viral sub-types.’ In particular they
demonstrated a significantly lower proportion of infec-
tions with both sub-types than would have been
expected if sub-type infections occurred independently
(p < 0.005). The authors also showed that of the 16
pupils who were ill twice (that is, reported clinical
symptoms and had serological evidence of infection),
the probability of dual infection increased with the time
s i n c et h ef i r s ti n f e c t i o n .O n l y4o ft h e1 6i n f e c t i o n s
occurred in the first two weeks after the primary infec-
tion, with the earliest infection occurring 6 days after
the first infection. This observation tentatively supports
the hypothesis of almost complete temporary immunity
at the time of infection with immunity waning over
time.
We have previously postulated that the apparent dif-
ference in risk from receipt of the seasonal vaccination
is due to the timing of the emergence of the pandemic
strain relative to the usual seasonal influenza season in
the Northern and Southern hemispheres [16]. In parti-
cular, if the pandemic occurred soon after the usual
influenza season, as it did in the first wave in the North-
ern hemisphere, recent prior infection with seasonal
influenza was protective against pH1N1 infection due to
the hypothesis of global temporary immunity, which
implies that infection with any strain of influenza con-
fers temporary immunity of 3-6 months duration to
infection with any other strain of influenza.
Individuals who had received seasonal vaccine had a
lower probability of being infected with the seasonal
strain and an apparent greater risk of pH1N1 infection,
having forfeited the protection from temporary immu-
nity that seasonal infection would have conferred. In
Southern hemisphere Victoria the pandemic strain dis-
placed the seasonal strain and comprised over 99% of all
circulating viruses for which sub-typing was available
[6,17]. Hence there was no apparent increased risk from
receipt of the seasonal vaccine in the Southern hemi-
sphere as there was virtually no seasonal influenza circu-
lating to give temporary immunity to the unvaccinated
individuals.
Here we develop a simple mathematical model to
demonstrate that the hypothesised temporary strain
transcending immunity, together with the timing of the
pandemic, give a plausible explanation for the differ-
ences seen between the Northern and Southern hemi-
sphere studies on the risk of pH1N1 infection associated
with prior seasonal vaccination during the first wave of
the outbreak. We have developed the model as a proof
of the concept that temporary immunity can possibly
explain the conflicting associations with seasonal vacci-
nation, without the need to assume that the vaccine
itself is harmful. The model captures the interacting
competition of seasonal influenza with a newly intro-
duced pandemic influenza strain but is not intended to
be a detailed strain-mutation model that accurately
reflects the long term evolution of influenza as recently
developed by other researchers [8,11-14,18,19]. The
model is deterministic and as such does not incorporate
the stochastic effects seen in real epidemics. Given we
are interested in simulating situations where the pan-
demic strain takes off, so that comparison can be made
to the actual occurrence, we did not consider stochastic
models were necessary. The aim was to keep the model
as simple as possible to determine if the strain trans-
cending immunity concept is a possible explanation of
the results seen in the vaccination risk studies.
The studies on the risk of the seasonal influenza vacci-
nation were conducted over the first wave of the out-
break (March-July 2009) [1,3-6]. Hence we mostly
restrict our model analysis to the case where the pH1N1
strain was introduced soon after the usual influenza sea-
son (Northern hemisphere), or slightly preceding or
concurrent with the usual influenza season (Southern
hemisphere). We postulate that in the Northern hemi-
sphere, in countries that had a sizable first wave of
pH1N1 infection in March-July 2009, this apparent risk
from the seasonal vaccination will be observed. In con-
trast, people infected with pH1N1 in the ‘second wave’
(October 2009 onwards) are not expected to show this
apparent risk due to the long delay from the previous
seasonal influenza season. We are currently not aware
of any studies from the second wave of pH1N1 infec-
tions to confirm or refute this postulation.
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The model is based on a standard SIR (Susceptible,
Infective, Recovered) compartmental model [20]. We
allow for two different strains, seasonal (denoted by 1)
and pandemic (denoted by 2), vaccination coverage for
the seasonal strain, relatively long-lived immunity to the
infecting strain and temporary immunity to any strain
after infection. Because we consider only a short time
span, the population size is considered constant and we
can refer to the proportion of people in each class
rather than the number in the class in the standard way.
In the interests of model simplicity, the population is
assumed to be homogeneous and well mixed and we
have made no attempt to distinguish between different
age classes or different transmission properties in sub-
populations. We have assumed that seasonal vaccination
provides protection against seasonal influenza infection
to a proportion of vaccinated people, depending on vac-
cine effectiveness and vaccine coverage, but that it pro-
vides no protection against infection with pH1N1.
As vaccination alters the susceptibility to the seasonal
strains we partition the population into 3 broad groups:
the proportion of hosts vaccinated with the seasonal
influenza vaccine (susceptible to the pandemic strain
only); unvaccinated hosts (susceptible to both pandemic
and seasonal influenza); and hosts susceptible to seasonal
influenza only. Initially this latter group only comprises
individuals who have some cross-immunity to the pan-
demic strain such as was seen with older people during
the pH1N1 2009 outbreak [21]. Because vaccination is
not completely effective, we model effective vaccination
coverage which we define as vaccination coverage multi-
plied by the vaccine effectiveness for the seasonal strain.
Throughout we let sub/super script 1 refer to seasonal
and 2 to pandemic strains. We further divide each of the
broad groups into the following classes: susceptible (S),
infective (I), temporarily immune to all strains (T)a n d
recovered (R). Superscripts are used to identify strain sus-
ceptibility type and subscripts the infecting strain. Hence
the classes considered are given by
S
12Unvaccinated, susceptible to 1 (seasonal) and 2
(pandemic)
S
1 Susceptible to 1 (seasonal) only
S
2Vaccinated, susceptible to 2 (pandemic) only
I1
12 Was susceptible to 1 and 2 and now infected with 1
I2
12 Was susceptible to 1 and 2 and now infected with 2
I1
1 Was susceptible to 1 only and now infected with 1
I2
2 Was susceptible to 2 only and now infected with 2
T1
12 Temporary immune to all strains, was susceptible
to 1 and 2 and recently infected with 1
T2
12 Temporary immune to all strains, was susceptible
to 1 and 2 and recently infected with 2
T1
1 Temporary immune to all strains, was susceptible
to 1 only and recently infected with 1
T2
2 Temporary immune to all strains, was susceptible
to 2 only and recently infected with 2
R Recovered and immune to 1 and 2
For example, depending on the effective vaccine cov-
erage, a proportion of hosts vaccinated against seasonal
i n f l u e n z aw i l lb es u s c e p t i b l eo n l yt ot h en e wp a n d e m i c
strain, and will be a member of the S
2 class. Once this
host is infected with pandemic influenza he/she will
move to the I2
2 class and will then recover to be in the
temporary immunity T2
2 class. Over time the host loses
temporary immunity to all strains and moves to the R
class. Of particular importance in this model are those
hosts who are unvaccinated and initially a member of
the S
12 class, being susceptible to both seasonal and
pandemic influenza. A member of this class who
becomes infected with seasonal influenza will then
move to the I1
12 class, and recover to the T1
12 class
before moving to the S
2 class. Membership of the T1
12
class is important since these hosts have developed tem-
porary immunity to pH1N1 infection. All possible dis-
ease progression paths are shown schematically in
Figure 1.
For a fixed population size S, I, T and R can also
represent the proportion of the population in each
group. If b is the transmission rate, g is the disease
recovery rate (hence 1/g is the average infectious period)
and δ the recovery rate from the temporary immunity
(hence 1/δ is the average length of the immunity period)
then the disease dynamics can be modelled by
dS
dt
SI I SI I
12 12
1
12
1
11 2
2
12
2
2 =− + − +  ()() (1)
dS
dt
SI I T
1
1
1
12
1
1
2
12 =− + +  () (2)
dS
dt
SI I T
2
2
2
12
2
2
1
12 =− + +  () (3)
dI
dt
SI I I 1
12
12
1
12
1
1
1
12 =+ −  () (4)
dI
dt
SI I I 2
12
12
2
12
2
2
2
12 =+ −  () (5)
dI
dt
SI I I 1
1
1
1
12
1
1
1
1 =+ −  () (6)
dI
dt
SI I I 2
2
2
2
12
2
2
2
2 =+ −  () (7)
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IT 1
12
1
12
1
12 =−  (8)
dT
dt
IT 2
12
2
12
2
12 =−  (9)
dT
dt
IT 1
1
1
1
1
1 =−  (10)
dT
dt
IT 2
2
2
2
2
2 =−  (11)
For example, equation (1) states that unvaccinated
individuals (S
12) can be either infected by seasonal influ-
enza infectious individuals ( ) II 1
12
1
1 + or pandemic strain
infectious individuals ( ) II 2
12
2
2 + equation (3) states that
the proportion of individuals only susceptible to the
pandemic strain (S
2), which is originally a proportion of
vaccinated hosts, can decrease by being infected by pan-
demic strain infectious individuals and can also increase
due to individuals who were originally susceptible to
both strains leaving the temporary immunity class after
being infected with the seasonal strain T1
12 (and hence
are susceptible to only the pandemic strain). As the
population size is fixed there is no need to keep track of
the R class.
The system of ordinary differential equations (1)-(11) is
solved numerically using MATLAB. Different initial con-
ditions are used depending on the effective vaccination
coverage and any prior immunity. Residual cross-immu-
nity from prior infection with related strains is incorpo-
rated in the initial conditions. The Canadian studies
reported a vaccine coverage of approximately 30% and a
vaccine effectiveness of 56% resulting in an effective
vaccination coverage of 17%. Other studies report vaccine
effectiveness for healthy young adults, the age group
most often infected with pH1N1, of approximately
S12
I12
1 I12
2
T12
1 T12
2
Unvaccinated
β β
γ γ
S1
I1
1
T1
1
β
γ
δ
S2
I2
2
T2
2
Vaccinated
β
γ
δ
R
δ δ
Figure 1 Possible disease paths through the different classes. S - susceptible, I - infective, T - temporarily immune to all strains, R -
recovered. Sub/superscripts 1 refer to seasonal and 2 to pandemic. Superscripts are strains the individuals was susceptible to, subscripts the
strain they are or have recently been infected with. Labels on the links are the relevant rates of progression between classes.
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demic strains are simulated by seeding the population
with a small proportion (0.01%) of one strain and at
some later time introducing the other strain. Values of b
and g a r ec h o s e nt og i v eab a s i cr e p r o d u c t i o nn u m b e r
(R0) [23] typical of influenza of between 1.3 and 1.8. For
simplicity it is assumed that both the seasonal and pan-
demic strains have the same basic reproduction number,
consistent with estimates of R for both seasonal [24] and
pandemic influenza [25]. The average duration of strain
transcending temporary immunity is modelled to be 120
days. The results presented here are relatively insensitive
to this parameter, except for the case where there is a
long interval between the introductions of seasonal and
pandemic influenza.
To compare our results with the observational studies
[1,3-6] we calculate the ratio of the odds of pH1N1
infection for vaccinated versus unvaccinated individuals.
If pv is the probability of a vaccinated individual being
infected with pH1N1 and pu is the probability of an
unvaccinated individual being infected with pH1N1 then
the odds ratio (OR) is defined to be
OR =
−
− p
p
p
p
v
v
u
u 1
1
(12)
Results and discussion
We compare the Southern hemisphere, when pandemic
influenza was not preceded by the circulation of seaso-
nal influenza, to the Northern hemisphere where pan-
demic influenza circulated soon after seasonal influenza.
Pandemic strain replacing the seasonal strain - Southern
hemisphere
In the Southern hemisphere pH1N1 2009 began circu-
lating just prior to the usual winter influenza season
which normally spans June to October [26]. In Victoria,
Australia the first confirmed case of pH1N1 infection
was recorded on 20 May 2009 but there is evidence that
the virus may have been circulating in Victoria for up to
a month prior to that [27]. Within a very short time
pH1N1 was the dominant strain circulating with over
99% of all circulating viruses for which sub-typing was
available being pH1N1 [6,17]. A study using sentinel
general practice surveillance data indicated that, in the
absence of a circulating seasonal strain, seasonal influ-
enza vaccine provided no effective protection against
pH1N1 infection [6].
Running the model described above with the pan-
demic strain introduction 30 days before the seasonal
strain, as was probably the case in Victoria [27], and an
effective vaccination coverage of just 10%, results in vir-
tually complete domination by the pandemic strain with
over 99.0% of cases being the pandemic strain. The
effective vaccination coverage in Victoria would have
b e e nl i k e l yt ob eo ft h eo r d e ro f1 1 % .W ee s t i m a t et h i s
using the vaccine coverage of 22% in the controls of the
case control study of vaccine effectiveness [6] and an
assumed vaccine effectiveness of 50% [28]. Higher effec-
tive vaccination coverage results in even higher domi-
nance of the pandemic strain. If the strains are
introduced concurrently, which was more typical in
other Australian jurisdictions, the pandemic strain is
modelled to comprise over 95% of cases. In these
instances, even with the same reproduction numbers for
each strain, seasonal vaccination gave the pandemic
strain a competitive advantage. As there was very little
seasonal influenza circulating the seasonal vaccine had
little effect on the odds ratio calculation of the risk of
receipt of the seasonal vaccine and so the odds ratio
was around 1.
Pandemic strain circulating after seasonal strain -
Northern hemisphere
In some temperate regions of the Northern hemisphere
the pandemic strain began circulating in a first wave
during April 2009, near the end of the usual winter
influenza season. Figure 2 shows a typical result from
the model of this scenario with the pandemic strain
introduced 60 days after the seasonal strain, an effective
vaccination coverage of 20% and R0 =1 . 5 .F i g u r e2 a
shows the proportion of newly infected individuals each
day. The seasonal strain is shown as the dashed blue
line and the pandemic strain as the solid black line.
Figure 2b shows the time-dependent cumulative number
of cases of each strain with the corresponding lines for
seasonal and pandemic influenza as in Figure 2a. Also
shown is the proportion of vaccinated individuals
(dashed green line) and the proportion of unvaccinated
individuals (red dot-dash line) who become infected
with pH1N1. The effect of seasonal vaccination on indi-
viduals infected with the pandemic strain is evident as
the proportion of infected vaccinated individuals is lar-
ger than the proportion of infected unvaccinated indivi-
duals. The odds ratio of vaccinated versus unvaccinated
individuals who were infected with pH1N1 can be calcu-
lated for this example as OR = 1.35. This apparent
increased risk of pH1N1 infection is due to unvacci-
nated individuals being more likely to have had seasonal
influenza infection and have developed temporary
immunity to the pandemic strain. This temporary
immunity was not seen in a proportion of vaccinated
individuals. We do not need to suggest a harmful effect
of the vaccine to find the apparent harmful association
of receipt of seasonal vaccine and pH1N1 infection.
As described earlier, to concur with the time frame of
t h ev a c c i n er i s ks t u d i e s ,w em a i n l yc o n s i d e rt h ef i r s t
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lysis to cases where the delay from the usual influenza
season to the pandemic strain introduction is less than
5 months. One case is run for a delay of 240 days to
demonstrate the case in the Northern hemisphere in
jurisdictions where there was no substantial first wave
and only a second wave (for example many parts of
Europe).
Of interest is the effect on the odds ratio of the timing
of the introduction of the pandemic strain and the level
of effective vaccination coverage. In particular, the
model supports the results found in the studies from
the USA of a weak, but not statistically significant risk,
[3-5] and the results from Canada [1] of significant
risks, illustrated by odds ratio estimates ranging from
1.4 to 2.5. Figure 3 is a plot of the odds ratio versus the
effective vaccination coverage for 6 different delays (15,
30, 60, 90, 120 and 240 days) from the introduction of
the seasonal strain to the introduction of the pandemic
strain. Values are plotted when both the seasonal and
pandemic strains had a cumulative incidence of at least
5% of the susceptible population. This ensures that both
epidemics are large enough to make calculation of the
odds ratio reliable. The largest odds ratio calculated was
1.42 for the shorter delays. Longer delays are associated
with lower modelled odds ratios, a reflection of waning
temporary immunity although there is still a consistent
odds ratio around 1.25 even with a delay of 120 days.
Delays of up to 120 days correspond to a first wave sce-
nario. Also included in Figure 3 are the results for a
long delay of 240 days consistent with jurisdictions that
had no significant pH1N1 first wave but a significant
second wave. In this case the odds ratio was around
1.07 which is substantially lower than for the shorter
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Figure 2 Pandemic delayed 60 days with a 20% effective seasonal vaccination coverage. Pandemic strain introduced 60 days after the
seasonal strain with a 20% effective seasonal vaccination coverage, a mean temporary immunity of 120 days and R0 = 1.5. a) Proportion of new
infectives each day infected with the seasonal strain (dashed blue line) and the pandemic strain (solid black line). b) Cumulative proportions
infected with the seasonal strain (dashed blue line), total infected with the pandemic strain (solid black line), vaccinated individuals infected with
the pandemic strain (dashed green line) and proportion of unvaccinated individuals infected with the pandemic strain (dot-dash red line).
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apparent risk from the seasonal vaccination may not be
observed since the odds ratio is close to 1. We are not
aware of any studies published that investigate this sec-
ond wave scenario.
As demonstrated in Figure 3 for each delay less than
or equal to 120 days there is an effective vaccination
coverage for which the odds ratio is a maximum. This is
the effective vaccination coverage where the apparent
risk of the seasonal vaccination is strongest. As the
effective vaccination coverage increases beyond this
maximum point the seasonal epidemic is smaller due to
the higher vaccination coverage. This smaller epidemic
size means the proportion of unvaccinated individuals
infected with the seasonal strain also decreases. The
result of this is that the odds ratio decreases as the
effective vaccination coverage increases in this region.
When the effective vaccination coverage is increased
further, the seasonal epidemic does not take off and
hence vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals appear
almost the same and the odds ratio tends to one. For all
delays there is no modelled increased risk from vaccina-
tion when the effective vaccination coverage is above
30%, since effective vaccine coverage at this level (for
example, 50% coverage with a vaccine that was 60%
effective or 60% coverage with a vaccine that was 50%
effective) aborts the seasonal epidemic.
The odds ratio of vaccinated versus unvaccinated indi-
viduals also depends on the disease reproduction num-
ber. Shown in Figure 4 is the odds ratio versus effective
vaccination coverage for 6 different basic reproduction
numbers ranging from 1.3 to 1.8 [25] for a pandemic
introduction delay of 60 days. The higher the reproduc-
tion number the higher the odds ratio and hence the
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Figure 3 Odds ratio for six different seasonal strain delays with R0 =1 . 5 . Odds ratio versus effective vaccination coverage for six different
delays from seasonal strain introduction to pandemic strain introduction. All calculations are with R0 = 1.5 and 1/δ = 120 days. Delays of 120
days or less correspond to a first wave scenario, the delay of 240 days corresponds to a second wave only scenario. The symbols on the lines
are to aid in differentiating the line types and not a specific data point of interest.
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pattern is also seen over all delays considered from 15
to 240 days.
In the Canadian studies [1] vaccination coverage of
around 30% was reported and vaccine effectiveness was
estimated as 56% giving an effective vaccination coverage
of approximately 17%. This is the region where there is
maximum effect of the seasonal vaccination for a delay of
the pandemic after the seasonal circulation of 60 to 90
days. In Canada the peak incidence of seasonal influenza
occurred 11 weeks (77 days) before the first notified
cases of pH1N1. The model gives maximum value of the
o d d sr a t i of r o m1 . 1 5t o1 . 7 5o v e rt h er a n g eo fp l a u s i b l e
reproduction numbers, delay between the introduction of
seasonal and pandemic influenza and effective vaccina-
tion coverage. These estimates are consistent with the
lower end of estimates from the Canadian studies.
However, if the cases of pandemic influenza were predo-
minantly in children, the reproduction number could be
higher than 1.8 [29]. In the Canadian studies, the Quebec
sample comprised 44% children with pH1N1 infection
and the Ontario study 61%. If we used a value of R =2 . 0
in our model, consistent with values reported for school
children in Japan [29], with a delay of 70 days and effec-
tive vaccination coverage of 17%, both consistent with
observations from Canada, we estimate an odds ratio of
2.0 for the risk of pH1N1 infection following receipt of
seasonal vaccine.
Over a wide range of parameter values the maximum
odds ratio occurs for effective vaccination coverage in
the range 15-25%. This range will be generated if vacci-
nation coverage is 20-40% and vaccine effectiveness is
50-70% [22,28]. We could therefore expect to see an
apparent harmful effect of vaccination in the Northern
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
Effective vaccination coverage %
F
i
n
a
l
 
o
d
d
s
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
 
R
0=1.3
R
0=1.4
R
0=1.5
R
0=1.6
R
0=1.7
R
0=1.8
Figure 4 Odds ratio for six different R0 values with 60 day delay. Odds ratio versus effective vaccination coverage for six different R0 values.
All calculations are with 1/δ = 120 days and the delay from seasonal strain introduction to pandemic strain introduction of 60 days. The symbols
on the lines are to aid in differentiating the line types and not a specific data point of interest.
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vaccine provided neither harm nor protection, when
seasonal vaccine coverage was in the range 20-40% and
seasonal influenza preceded pandemic influenza
circulation.
When the pandemic occurs after circulation of the
seasonal strain, the maximum odds ratio does not occur
until near the end of the pandemic since the cumulative
number of cases with pH1N1 infection affects the odds
ratio in an ongoing manner. To obtain an accurate mea-
sure of the association between seasonal vaccination and
pH1N1 infection, it is necessary to measure the final
odds ratio once the pandemic is over. The US studies
that showed only a weak risk associated with vaccination
[3-5] used data only up to early May or June, which was
before the end of the first wave of the pandemic. These
odds ratios may be low because of this but could still be
consistent with our hypothesis.
Conclusions
Our simple strain competition model incorporating a
temporary strain transcending immunity gives results
consistent with findings of the association between
receipt of seasonal influenza vaccine and the risk of
pH1N1 infection in both the Northern and Southern
hemispheres. Our model was predicated on the assump-
tion that seasonal vaccine had no effect on the risk of
pH1N1 infection. The apparently conflicting results,
where some studies from the Northern hemisphere
reported an apparently harmful association of receipt of
seasonal vaccination with pH1N1 infection, while
neither benefit nor harm was found in the Southern
hemisphere, can possibly be explained by temporary
immunity and the timing of the circulation of seasonal
and pandemic influenza infection, without the need to
suggest a harmful effect of the vaccine itself. Although it
s h o u l db en o t e dt h a tt h ec o n c e p to ft e m p o r a r yi m m u -
nity is conjecture at this stage, it is supported by the
study of Japanese school children when influenza A
(H1N1) circulated soon after A(H3N2) [15]. Our model
showed that seasonal vaccination appeared to increase
the risk of pH1N1 infection only in the Northern hemi-
sphere, when seasonal influenza preceded pandemic
influenza circulation, and only due to a proportion of
the population having recently been infected with seaso-
nal influenza developing temporary immunity to pH1N1
infection. This only applies to the first wave of pH1N1
in the Northern hemisphere and is unlikely to apply to
the second wave when the delay from seasonal influenza
season to the introduction of the pandemic strain is
considerably longer.
The maximum effect was modelled to occur with sea-
sonal vaccination coverage in the range of 20-40%. The
apparent risk increased with increasing reproduction
number. A section of the population with a higher
intrinsic reproduction number, such as children, would
therefore appear to have had a higher risk. Our model,
incorporating the hypothesized concept of temporary
immunity, reproduced risk estimates very similar to
those reported without needing to suggest that the vac-
cine itself was harmful.
If the strain-transcending temporary immunity con-
cept is correct then other Northern hemisphere juris-
dictions that had a sizable first wave of pH1N1
infection (for example the United Kingdom) would be
expected to show an increased apparent risk of the
seasonal vaccination. We know of no published studies
from the United Kingdom to confirm or refute this at
present. Further vaccination risk studies covering a
wider time interval incorporating the Northern hemi-
sphere second wave are eagerly awaited and will pro-
vide further information. For example, if a Canadian
s t u d yo fs e c o n dw a v ep H 1 N 1i n f e c t i o n sf o u n dn o
apparent risk due to seasonal vaccination then that
gives some additional weight to the temporary immu-
nity hypothesis, alternatively if a similar apparent risk
is found then an alternative mechanism is more likely
to be involved.
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